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The	Iconography	of	Disruptive	Bodies:	Social	Media	and	Medical	
Identities	Abstract	As	an	artist	I	examine	how	photographs	discipline	an	individual’s	relationship	to	her	or	his	body	and	society.	Working	on	the	premise	that	the	idealization	of	certain	bodies	has	led	to	a	reduced	visual	language	of	expression	for	the	body,	I	explore	ways	of	expanding	this	iconography.			 As	a	historical	backdrop	to	this	study	I	will	discuss	photographs	created	in	La	Salpêtrière	hospital	in	the	late-nineteenth	century.	During	this	time,	the	women	 who	 best	 performed	 the	 contorted	 shapes	 of	 hysteria	 were	photographed	for	the	Iconographie	photographique	de	la	Salpêtrière	(Charcot).	Film	stars	began	to	imitate	the	women	in	the	photographs,	and	the	gestures	of	hysteria	transformed	popular	expressions	of	passion.			 In	 contemporary	 culture,	 online	 social	 networks	 mediate	 our	relationships;	we	 present	 ourselves	 to	 others	 in	 a	 series	 of	 two-dimensional	images.	In	the	virtual	realm,	the	role	of	photography	could	be	viewed	negatively	because	it	fixes	the	individual,	creating	a	permanent	record	of	a	self	that	can	be	judged	using	the	quantifiable	system	of	likes	and	favourites.	But	the	selfie	is	also	creative;	it	offers	unlimited	possibilities	of	performance	and	self-expression.			 In	this	chapter	I	examine	the	cyclical	relationship	between	body	ideals,	online	social	networks	and	individual	bodies	by	exploring	the	selfie’s	potential	for	 self-creation,	 performance	 and	 masquerade.	 Alongside	 the	‘healthy’	productive	 body	 I	 will	 consider	 illness	 as	 a	 form	 of	 unconscious	 protest,	referring	 to	 hysteria	 and	 its	 contemporary	 counterparts,	 binge	 and	 restrict	eating	disorders.	Using	 the	Foucauldian	notion	of	 the	disciplined	body,	 I	will	theorize	online	social	networks	and	selfies	as	potential	sites	for	disruption	of	hegemonic	body-image	ideals.			Keywords	Identity,	Gender,	Medical,	Eating	disorder,	 Selfie,	Hysteria,	 Salpêtrière,	 Social-networking,	Photography,	Performance.	
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The	Iconography	of	Disruptive	Bodies:	Social	Media	and	Medical	
Identities	Ideal	Consumers	Marx	 says	‘the	machine	accommodates	 itself	 to	 the	weakness	 of	 the	human	being	 in	 order	 to	 make	 the	 weak	 human	 being	 into	 a	 machine’ 	 (p.	 85).	Capitalism	turns	me	into	a	commodity	that	consumes	and	is	consumed.	Through	the	consumption	of	commodities	I	improve	the	appeal	of	my	body	and	turn	it	into	a	display	case	for	sign-values.	Objects	are	not	purchased	because	of	use	or	exchange	value	but	because	of	the	social	prestige	they	bestow	upon	the	owner	(Baudrillard,	pp.	29-30).	 I	participate	 in	a	system	of	sign-value	exchange	that	reinforces	existing	social	norms	and	structures.	Through	multiple	discourses,	from	 medicine	 to	 popular	 culture,	 the	 dominant	 classes	 impose	 their	 body	standards	 on	 me,	 and	 by	 adhering	 to	 the	 standard	 I	 disseminate	 it	 further.	Baudrillard	called	the	process	in	which	the	dominant	classes	control	the	sign-value	of	objects	“semiotic	privilege”	(p.	116).	My	body	does	not	escape	this	process	of	signification.			 The	healthy	body	acts	as	a	sign-value	for	success,	a	strong	work	ethic	and	self-control;	it	is	viewed	as	a	productive	resource	and	medium	for	creating	“bodily	capital”(Dworkin	and	Wachs,	p.	104).	The	unhealthy	body	signifies	a	lack	of	self-control	and	is	deemed	to	be	an	obstacle	to	productive	labour.	There	is	a	conflict	at	the	heart	of	consumer	culture	between	the	imperative	to	work	hard	 and	 delay	 gratification,	 and	 the	 consumer	 dictum	 of	 instant	 pleasure.	Fitness	 and	 working	 out	 demonstrate	 my	 ability	 to	 balance	 these	 opposing	forces	(Crawford,	p.	92).	Health	is	a	way	of	exerting	control	over	the	population,	transforming	leisure	into	a	form	of	body	labour	that	compliments	the	individual
’s	economic	function.			 To	further	disseminate	the	healthy	body	ideal	and	deter	resistance	to	it,	confession	and	shame	are	used	as	mechanisms	of	coercion.	In	terms	of	health,	the	 confessional	 body	 signifies	 a	 person	 with	 the	 financial	 resources	 to	undertake	 self-analysis	 and	 self-improvement	 practices	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	bodily	 capital.	 The	 act	 of	 confession	“exonerates,	 redeems,	 and	 purifies…it	
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unburdens	of	wrongs,	liberates	and	promises	salvation”(Foucault,	pp.	61-2).	In	contrast	to	this,	shamed	bodies,	traditionally	working	class,	poor	and	other	marginalized	 people	“are	 subjected	 to	 the	‘bio-power’ 	 of	 experts	 who	impose	upon	these	bodies	judgments	that	explain	their	pathologies	and	failures
”(Dworkin	and	Wachs,	p.	14).	Shamed	bodies	are	viewed	and	manipulated	by	others	 while	 confessional	 bodies	 are	 self-regarding	 and	 able	 to	 create	themselves.			 In	 capitalist	 societies	 the	 body	 is	 scrutinised	 in	 order	 to	 identify	“problems” 	 and	 then	 commodities	 are	 developed	 to	 solve	 them.	 Many	commodities	 tempt	me	with	 the	promise	 that	 I	will	“feel	better,”	 implying	that	my	health	will	be	improved	by	the	act	of	consumption.	But	the	subtext	of	the	advertisement	is	frequently	that	I	will	feel	better	because	I	will	experience	increased	social	value	due	to	an	improvement	in	my	appearance.	Rosalind	Gill	describes	this	trend	referring	to	Nike’s	“Just	Do	It”	campaigns:		 The	 fetishization	 of	 fitness	 is	 arguably	 more	 pernicious	 than	 that	 of	appearance	because	we	are	interpellated	as	morally	responsive	for	how	well	we	do.	If	we	don’t	have	the	looks	of	a	fashion	model	we	may	be	less	socially	valued	but	it	is	not	entirely	our	fault.	But	if	we	don’t	‘keep	in	shape’	we	are	culpable:	we	 let	ourselves	go	–	 the	most	dreaded	sin	of	contemporary	 affluent	 societies.	 The	 advert	 urges	 us	 to	 reject	 external	templates	of	beauty,	whilst	simultaneously	enrolling	women	in	a	regime	of	 disciplinary	 power	 in	 which	 they	 become	 morally	 responsible	 for	disciplining	 their	 own	 bodies,	 and	 where	 beauty	 work	 is	 redefined	 in	terms	of	health	and	pleasure	(Gill,	pp.	86-7).		By	camouflaging	beauty	standards	as	health	standards	advertisements	can	pre-emptively	 counter	 complaints	 about	 sexism	 and	 objectification.	 At	 the	 same	time,	 health	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 personal	 responsibility,	 achieved	 through	commodified	leisure	activities	that	conceal	health	inequalities	related	to	class	and	 race.	 Feminist	 discourse	 relating	 to	 empowerment	 is	 subsumed	 into	 a	
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consumer	 discourse	 of	 self-interest	 and	 narcissism,	 and	 the	 healthy	 body	supplants	the	desirable	body.		 In	 the	 process	 of	 examination,	 dissection	 and	 improvement	 by	 an	interminable	succession	of	commodities,	I	am	alienated	from	my	body.	I	come	to	 view	 it	 as	 an	 external	 object	 that	 must	 be	 managed	 and	 controlled	 by	consuming	the	correct	products.	My	body	 is	 fragmented	 into	sign-values	and	transformed	into	a	commodity-fetish	when	signs	of	individuality	are	eradicated	in	the	production	of	a	socially	acceptable	surface.	When	defining	the	commodity	fetish	Baudrillard	returns	to	the	original	meaning	of	the	term:			a	fabrication,	an	artifact,	a	labor	of	appearances	and	signs.	What	quickly	becomes	apparent	is	the	aspect	of	faking,	of	artificial	registering	–	in	short,	of	a	cultural	sign	labor	–	and	that	this	is	the	origin	of	the	status	of	the	fetish	object,	 and	 thus	 also	 plays	 some	 part	 in	 the	 fascination	 it	 exercises.	(Baudrillard,	p.	91)		The	term	“fetish”	comes	from	the	Latin	facticious	meaning	“to	make”	and	the	 Portuguese	 feitico	meaning	“artificial” .	 It	 had	 a	 dual	 meaning:	 as	 an	adjective	 it	meant	artificial,	human-made	and	 in	some	cases,	 fraudulent.	As	a	noun	it	refers	to	idolatry,	an	act	of	witchcraft,	or	an	object	of	enchantment.	In	“The	 Origin	 of	 the	 Fetish” 	 William	 Pietz	 describes	 how	 the	 body	 was	 also	sometimes	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 fetish.	 In	 “ De	 Spectaculis” 	 Tertullian	designated	 wrestling	 and	 bodybuilding	 as	 forms	 of	 fetishistic	 body	enhancement	that	produced	“an	artificial	body	so	as	to	surpass	God’s	work
”	(qtd.	in	Pietz,	p.	26).		 In	contemporary	consumer	culture	the	body	is	similarly	manufactured	through	the	process	of	commodification	and	body	maintenance.	Its	function	as	an	 object	 of	 enchantment	 is	 two-fold;	 for	 the	 individual	who	 carries	out	 the	extensive	“body-work”	the	body	is	the	main	focus	of	her	or	his	attention;	and,	because	the	healthy	body	is	synonymous	with	the	desirable	body,	it	also	charms	and	bedazzles	those	around	it.	It	functions	as	both	meanings	of	the	feitico.		
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Sign-Body	Exchange	Evidence	of	the	preoccupation	with,	and	enchantment	by,	the	commodity-fetish	body	might	be	discerned	in	the	phenomenon	of	self-presentation	known	as	the	selfie.	 The	 proliferation	 of	 mobile	 phones	 with	 cameras	 has	 enabled	 large	swathes	of	the	population	to	take	and	share	photographs	of	themselves	taken	by	themselves.	The	subject	is	no	longer	the	absent	object	of	their	photographic	mementos.	However,	a	web	search	reveals	that	the	most	common	form	of	selfie	is	not	a	souvenir	of	a	place	or	event	but	a	record	of	the	individual	in	seemingly	private	spaces.	Some	form	of	confessional	practice	might	be	suggested	when	an	individual	 presents	 her	 or	 his	 body	 in	 the	 virtual	 realm	 for	 the	 scrutiny	 of	unknown	observers.	Why	else	would	multiple	social	media	websites	offer	 so	many	quantifiable	ways	to	demonstrate	that	a	photograph	has	been	viewed	and	a	value	judgment	made?	People	gauge	the	“success”	of	their	selfies	on	how	many	“likes”,	“favourites”,	retweets,	and	“shares”	they	receive.	This	is	how	the	currency	of	 the	body	 is	determined,	and	how	shaming	 looks	enforce	bodily	 norms.	 Selfies	 also	 disseminate	 sign-value;	 body	 ideals	 and	 fashion	trends	are	perpetuated	in	the	exchange	of	images	on	social	media	networks.			 Selfies	 often	 seem	 uncomfortably	 intimate	 because	 a	 lone	 figure	 is	located	in	a	private	space,	such	as	a	bathroom	or	bedroom.	The	camera	is	visible,	reflected	alongside	the	body	making	all	aspects	of	the	look	manifest;	I	see	the	reflection	the	posing	subject	also	sees,	we	both	view	the	individual	as	an	image.	Object	and	viewer	are	flattened	into	one	viewing	position;	all	are	equal.	As	I	can	see	 the	 camera-phone	 in	 the	 photograph	 I	 am	 denied	 the	 position	 of	 active	recording	device	and	powerful	unseen	observer.	Instead	I	am	pushed	into	the	place	of	a	mirror	image,	and	my	identification	with	the	body	in	the	photograph	is	increased.			 In	 Lacanian	 psychoanalysis	 the	mirror	 phase	marks	 the	 individual’s	entry	 into	the	visual	realm.	At	 first	an	 infant	lacks	the	motor	skills	needed	to	fend	 for	 her-	 or	 himself	 and	 experiences	 its	 body	 as	 fragments	 that	 are	indistinguishable	 from	 the	 rest	of	 the	world.	During	 the	 first	 year	 of	 life	 the	infant	is	held	in	front	of	a	mirror	and	told	“there	you	are.”	By	apprehending	itself	 as	 an	 image	 of	 a	 complete	 body,	 the	 infant	 is	 able	 to	 define	 its	 own	
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boundaries	 and	 begins	 to	 master	 its	 body.	 	 As	 Joël	 Dor	 describes:	“ In	 re-
cognising	 himself	 through	 the	 image,	 he	 is	 able	 to	 reassemble	 the	 scattered,	fragmented	body	into	a	unified	totality,	the	representation	of	his	own	body”(Dor	a,	p.	96).	Because	the	infant	is	still	dependent	on	others,	the	unified	body	is	anticipated	rather	than	experienced.	As	a	result,	the	infant	is	simultaneously	captivated	by	an	image	of	its	body	and	alienated	by	the	superiority	of	the	image	that	it	cannot	live	up	to.	The	recognition	of	self	as	subject	and	object	produces	a	split.	The	subject	tries	to	reconcile	“self”	with	the	image	by	identifying	with	and	 emphasising	 favourable	 characteristics	 viewed	 in	 other	 people	 and	repressing	unfavourable	ones.	The	subject	is	a	work	of	idealization	and	denial	of	unconscious	knowledge	that	the	self	is	lacking	or	incomplete.		 If	 an	 individual	 is	 unable	 to	 assimilate	 aspects	 of	 other	 people’ s	identity,	but	identifies	with	them	so	powerfully	that	they	try	to	become	exact	copies	 of	 that	 identity,	 s/he	 may	 be	 hysterical.	 According	 to	 Juliet	 Mitchell,	hysteria	 is	not	caused	by	 intergenerational	conflict	between	child	and	parent	but	 lateral	 rivalry	 between	 siblings	 and	 peers.	 A	 sibling	 rival	 threatens	 the	hysteric’s	position	as	a	unique	child.	The	hysteric	feels	displaced	and	absent;	the	anxiety	caused	by	this	emptiness	of	self	is	temporarily	relieved	by	powerful	identification	with,	and	jealousy	towards,	the	rival.		There	is	an	aspect	of	one-upmanship	because	the	hysteric	is	desperate	to	gain	superiority	over	the	rival	who	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 better	 and	more	 loved.	 This	 leads	 to	 an	 escalation	 of	behaviour	(Mitchell,	p.	137).		 Mitchell	goes	on	to	describe	the	hysteric’s	seductive,	attention-seeking	behaviour	 as	 an	 excessive	 presence.	 The	 hysteric	“neither	 remembers	 nor	expects	 to	 be	 remembered	 if	 he	 is	 not	 always	 present	 –	 so	 he	 always	 over	insistently	 presents	 himself ” (Mitchell,	 p.	 212).	 When	 threatened	 by	displacement	 by	 a	 rival,	 the	 hysteric	 unconsciously	 retaliates	 by	 splintering	her/his	identity	into	fragments.	This	fractured	personality	fends	off	the	threat	of	absence	and	annihilation	by	forcefully	presenting	multiple	aspects	of	the	self	in	a	way	that	is	unavoidable	for	others.		 In	 capitalist	 societies	 the	 commodification	 of	 the	 body	 supports	 and	encourages	hysterical	identification.	Advertisements	address	the	consumer	in	a	
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way	 that	 appeals	 to	 her/his	 hysterical	 tendency	 and	 enables	 it	 to	 develop;	adverts	encourage	jealousy	and	rivalry	between	peers.	The	viewer	of	an	advert	is	led	to	believe	that	the	people	in	the	advert	are	superior	because	they	possess	the	commodity	in	question.	The	consumer	is	encouraged	to	continually	judge	her/his	self	in	relation	to	others	and	resolve	inferiorities	through	consumption	of	commodities.	When	individuals	standardize	their	bodies	to	the	ideal	aesthetic	of	 their	 social	 group,	 the	 body	 becomes	 increasingly	 difficult	 to	 differentiate	from	others,	further	enabling	hysterical	identification.			 Consumers	are	also	encouraged	to	view	the	commodities	they	purchase	as	 carriers	 of	 meaning	 relating	 to	 identity,	 feelings	 and	 relationships	 with	others.	It	seems	it	is	the	commodities	that	express,	feel	or	think	in	the	place	of	the	 person.	 Because	 identities	 are	 increasingly	 created	 through	 commodity	consumption,	consumers	may	unconsciously	feel	absent	or	empty	of	meaning.	The	 consumer	 may	 feel	 that	 a	 rival	 commodity	 has	 displaced	 them.	 If	 the	consumer	 believes	 s/he	will	 absorb	 the	 values	 attributed	 to	 the	 commodity,	identification	with	it	may	be	hysterical.	The	dread	of	non-existence	that	results	from	 this	 commodity	 identification	 is	 warded	 off	 by	 an	 endless	 series	 of	mimetic,	hysterical	identifications	with	commodities:	a	compulsion	to	consume.	 		 For	 a	 brief	 period	 of	 time	 I	 created	 selfies	 and	 shared	 them	 online.	 I	followed	the	“selfie”	hashtag	on	Twitter	to	try	to	understand	the	appeal	of	producing	 this	 form	 of	 self-portrait.	 I	 discovered	 that	 a	 large	 number	 of	followers	on	Twitter	are	commercial	enterprises	posing	as	people.	They	search	under	 the	“ selfie” 	 hashtag	 to	 target	 individuals	 with	 make-up,	 fitness	programmes	and	cosmetic	 treatments	claiming	to	help	them	achieve	an	 ideal	look.	These	commodities	are	also	promoted	using	the	“selfie”	hashtag,	so	the	distinction	between	the	body	and	the	commodity	is	totally	erased;	it	implies	that	the	commodity	is	already	a	part	of	the	consumer.		 Perhaps	selfies	are	an	inevitable	response	to	this	culture.	Poses,	gestures	and	 facial	 expressions	 are	mimicked	 and	 exaggerated,	 suggesting	 that	 selfie	producers	are	trying	to	out-do,	or	perhaps	more	accurately,	out-sexualise	each	other	in	an	endless	search	for	a	stable	identity	as	the	object	of	desire	for	another.		
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	 In	 some	 selfies	 a	 person	 poses	 between	 two	 or	 more	 mirrors	 that	multiply	 the	 body.	 One	 is	 able	 to	 see	 different	 angles	 of	 the	 body,	 as	 if	 one	inhabits	more	than	one	viewing	position.	This	type	of		photograph	could	suggest	a	hysterical	form	of	self-presentation	in	which	the	subject	rejects	that	the	body	is	incomplete	or	lacking	and	“dreams	of	a	perfect	erotic	body	that	could	display	itself	 as	 a	whole”(David-Ménard,	 p.	 130).	 Psychoanalysts	 such	 as	Monique	David-Ménard	and	Joël	Dor	suggest	that	the	hysteric	is	only	able	to	acknowledge	her	or	his	desire	through	the	desire	of	the	other.	By	attempting	to	become	the	object	 of	 the	 other’s	 desire,	 the	 hysteric	 often	 searches	 for	 a	 form	of	 body	modification	that	“would	adjust	their	image	to	their	ideal”	(Catherine	Millot	qud.	in	Dor	b,	p.	193).	Paradoxically,	the	need	for	a	fantasy	body	modification	proves	the	 lack	that	 is	denied.	These	selfies	 fragment	the	body	 in	a	way	that	could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 an	 illusion	 of	 completeness	 and	 the	 excessive	presentation	of	a	splintered	subject.		 In	 Structures	 and	 Perversions	 Dor	 recounts	 the	 case	 of	 a	 hysterical	woman	who	fantasises	that	a	male	friend	unexpectedly	visits	her.	In	the	fantasy	she	 goes	 into	 the	 bathroom	 to	make	 herself	 presentable	 and	“would	 enjoy	imagining,	with	a	delight	she	could	not	explain,	what	her	friend	might	think	she	was	doing	in	there”	(Dor	b,	pp.	24-5).	The	fantasy	always	ended	abruptly	at	this	 point;	 of	 not	 knowing.	 Dor	 says	 this	 scene	 signifies	 an	 essential	characteristic	of	hysteria,	the	donning	of	a	mask	in	order	to	place	“herself	at	a	distance	 from	 herself	 and	 thus	 from	 her	 desire,	 so	 that	 she	 may	 remain	 in	ignorance	of	this	desire”	(Dor	b,	p.	26).	By	seeing	herself	in	the	mirror,	she	is	able	 to	 view	 herself	 as	 an	 external	 object,	 an	 object	 of	 desire	 for	 the	 other,	without	acknowledging	that	she	has	desire	of	her	own.	Multiple	screens	impose	distance;	 mirror	 surfaces	 and	 closed	 doors	 ensure	 that	 desire	 is	 only	 ever	imagined	and	remains	unsatisfied.	This	connotes	what	Dor	describes	as	the	“hysterical	pretence”	in	which	“the	subject’s	desire	is	always	there,	but	only	provided	it	gets	itself	represented	where	it	is	not	by	finding	a	proxy	in	the	desire	of	the	other”		(Dor	b,	pp.	25-6).		The	hysteric’s	desire	is	designed	to	bring	the	other	person’s	desire	into	existence;	it	disappears	as	soon	as	the	desire	of	the	other	is	shown.	As	an	example,	Dor	recounts	the	actions	of	a	hysterical	woman	
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who	 spends	 time	 in	 an	 area	 populated	 by	 prostitutes.	 When	 a	 potential	customer	approaches	her	 she	 replies	“You’re	making	a	mistake,	 I’m	not	that	kind	of	woman”	(Dor	b,	p.	137).	She	may	seem	to	want	to	act	upon	desire	but	this	is	a	hysterical	pretence,	she	wants	to	be	desired	rather	than	participate	in	a	desiring	relation.		 In	the	production	of	mirror	selfies,	a	lone	figure	photographs	her	or	his	body	 as	 a	 reflection	 and	 disseminates	 it	 to	 an	 unknown	 audience	 via	 social	media	 networks.	 The	 photograph	 has	 not	 been	 taken	 because	 the	 individual	wants	 to	 know	 how	 she	 or	 he	 looks	 at	 that	 particular	 moment;	 rather,	 its	purpose	is	to	capture	the	mirror	image	s/he	has	already	apprehended	in	order	to	make	 it	 visible	 for	 someone	else.	By	 literally	putting	her	or	his	 self	 in	 the	picture,	s/he	seems	to	be	trying	to	meet	the	gaze,	to	see	her/his	own	body	from	the	place	where	the	other	looks	at	it.	The	question	“is	this	what	you	want	me	to	be?”	is	answered	in	the	form	of	“likes”,	“favourites”,	retweets	and	“shares”.			 Hysterical	pretence	seems	to	have	found	its	visual	form	in	selfies.	Unlike	the	woman	hysterically	identifying	with	a	prostitute,	the	selfie	producer	is	only	required	to	appear	desiring,	the	distancing	effect	of	virtual	interaction	means	the	hysterical	pretence	is	not	exposed.	The	object	of	desire	is	able	to	offer	itself,	safe	 in	 the	knowledge	 that	 it	will	not	be	 called	upon	 to	 satisfy	desire.	 Selfies	enable	a	hysterical	individual	to	repeatedly	and	insistently	present	the	self	to	a	mass	audience.	Because	gestures	and	actions	are	mimicked	and	exaggerated	in	selfies,	 they	 are	 an	 expression	of	 hysterical	 identification	 and	 the	method	 of	transmitting	hysteria	 through	peer	groups.	As	Mitchell	says,	symptoms	today	would	be	“mass	experiences	in	an	era	of	mass	communication”	(Mitchell,	p.	121).	She	goes	on	to	state:		 Today	the	social	situation	which	favours	a	conscious,	public	enactment	in	place	of	private	driven	symptoms	is	best	summed	up	in	the	philosophy	of	post-modernity	which	eschews	metanarratives,	 truth,	 representation	 in	favour	of	fragmentation,	the	proliferation	of	desires,	the	ascendancy	of	the	
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will	and	the	act	and	 language	that	gets	one	what	one	wants.	This	 is	 the	valorisation	of	performance	and	performativity	(Mitchell,	p.	133).		Post-modern,	capitalist	societies	reward	the	behavioural	 traits	of	hysteria’s	hyper-sexualised	 narcissism.	 Selfies	 enable	 individuals	 to	 make	 hysterical	demands	 for	 attention	 to	 a	 mass	 audience.	 Hysterical	 demand	 is	 met	 with	hysterical	 identification	 and	 a	 global	 outbreak	 of	 hysteria	 results.	 As	 Juliet	Mitchell	proposes,	hysteria	is	becoming	the	norm	(Mitchell,	p.	133).		 	 		Celebrity	Selfies	The	phenomenon	of	the	selfie	may	have	begun	with	the	celebrity	selfies	in	which	celebrities	 share	 photographs	 of	 their	 private	 lives	 with	 online	 followers.	Celebrity	selfies	often	have	a	commercial	imperative	beyond	the	production	of	bodily	 capital,	 whereby	 celebrities	 photograph	 themselves	 with	 own-brand	commodities	or	products	they	have	been	paid	to	endorse.	Media	outlets,	such	as	
The	Daily	Mail	Online,	frequently	feature	celebrity	selfies	alongside	a	“Fashion	Finder”	section	that	directs	viewers	to	online	shops	where	they	can	purchase	the	outfits	worn	by	celebrities.	The	message	is	clear:	through	commodification	you	can	turn	yourself	into	the	image.		 			 In	an	article	about	cosmetic	surgery	and	the	“fashionable	face,”	Meredith	Jones	 discusses	 the	 increasingly	 blurred	 boundary	 between	 real	 flesh	 and	virtual	 representations	 of	 the	 body.	 Because	 people	 tend	 to	 select	 the	“fashionable	faces”	they	wish	to	emulate	from	magazines,	the	type	of	face	that	is	idealised	 is	 “visibly	 manufactured”	 (Jones,	 p.	 194).	 A	 manufactured	 face	 is	created	 with	 studio	 lighting,	 makeup,	 digital	 manipulation	 and	 cosmetic	surgery.	Our	standards	of	beauty,	for	the	body	as	well	as	the	face,	are	based	on	stylised	 and	manipulated	 images	 rather	 than	 flesh	 bodies	 in	 the	 real	world.	When	individuals	identify	with	selfies	they	do	not	wish	to	copy	the	celebrities	who	 produce	 the	 photographs;	 instead	 they	 attempt	 to	 replicate	 the	photographs.	 		 The	selfie	is	a	form	of	advertising	and	sign-value	exchange,	but	one	that	I	believe	to	be	more	insidious	than	mainstream,	professionally	created	imagery.	Selfies	have	a	spontaneous	quality	and	are	frequently	taken	in	the	home.	The	
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viewer	 identifies	 with	 the	 photograph	 because	 the	 activities	 bear	 some	resemblance	to	her	or	his	own	daily	routine.	The	seemingly	un-posed	moment	obscures	 the	 commercial	 basis	 of	 these	 images.	 An	 image-literate	 audience	knows	the	bodies	in	advertising	and	magazine	images	are	created	by	teams	of	hairdressers,	makeup	artists	and	digital	re-touchers,	but	the	selfie	masks	this	construction.	It	seems	to	present	the	celebrity	body	as	already	perfect	without	the	need	for	pre-	and	post-production	work.	The	celebrity	selfie	implies	that	a	flawless	body	is	actually	achievable	at	a	time	when	the	ideal	bodies	of	both	men	and	women	are	 impossibly	 thin	 in	some	areas	and	 rounded	and	muscular	 in	others.	 They	 are	 montage	 bodies	 created	 by	 commodities	 and	 surgical	enhancement.		Because	these	artificial	bodies	are	presented	as	body	ideals	they	act	as	advertisements	for	the	products	and	procedures	used	to	create	them.			 Not	 only	 does	 the	 selfie	 appear	 spontaneous	 and	 unadulterated	 in	comparison	 to	 an	 advert,	 but	 also	 the	 manipulation	 that	 is	 expected	 and	accepted	 in	 advertising	 is	 reviled	 in	 photographs	 on	 social	media	 networks.	Whenever	 I	 put	“selfie”	 into	 a	web	 search,	 the	 list	 of	 suggested	 searches	inevitably	includes	“selfie	fails”.	Occasionally	they	are	bad	taste	selfies	(those	taken	 in	Auschwitz	or	at	Nelson	Mandela’s	 funeral,	 for	example)	or	 images	where	 something	 embarrassing	 has	 been	 inadvertently	 revealed,	 but	 on	 the	whole	they	form	a	catalogue	of	digital	manipulation	disasters.	Men	try	to	make	their	muscles	bigger	and	their	stomachs	flatter,	while	women	sculpt	their	bodies	to	an	unachievable	hourglass	shape.	A	 lack	of	 technical	knowhow	gives	them	away;	the	tiles	and	furniture	behind	the	figure	also	warp	and	bulge	exposing	the	attempted	fakery.			 In	order	to	uncover	the	artifice	in	selfies	taken	by	individuals	who	are	skilled	using	photographic	manipulation	techniques,	a	piece	of	software	called	
Mito	Restore	has	recently	been	developed	that	returns	manipulated	images	to	their	original	state.		The	message	is	clear:	your	photographs	will	not		lie	for	you.	Presenting	an	ideal	fantasy	in	the	virtual	realm	is	now	less	satisfying	because	
Mito	Restore	has	undermined	the	fantasy.	There	is	no	escape	but	to	actually	try	to	achieve	the	impossible	body	ideals	prescribed	by	celebrity	selfies.			 The	desire	to	become	a	“living	image”	is	encouraged	in	consumer	culture.	Commodity	 manufacturers	 claim	 to	 create	 cosmetics	 that	 produce	 effects	
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equivalent	to	Photoshop	techniques.	Revlon	says	its	“Photoready”	makeup	will	“airbrush”	skin	to	make	it	appear	flawless	(Jones,	p.	204),	while	products	such	as	“All	 in	One	InstaBlur”	by	the	Body	Shop	and	Garnier’s	“5-second	Blur	Skin	Smoother”	 claim	 to	 reduce	 the	 appearance	 of	 pores	 using	 “blurring”	 or	“liquefying”	 technology.	 These	 products	 indicate	 that	 anxiety	 is	 caused	 by	increasing	opportunities	to	be	photographed	and	to	photograph	one’s	self.	They	also	demonstrate	a	desire	in	the	consumer	to	reduce	the	difference	between	the	real	face	and	its	2-dimensional	image.	When	these	products	fail	to	recreate	the	perfection	 of	 the	 image,	 cosmetic	 surgery	 is	 the	 only	 remaining	 real	 world	equivalent	of	the	digital	manipulators	toolbox.	 		 Negative	 peer	 reviews	 on	 social	 media	 websites	 and	 technological	advancements	that	reveal	digital	manipulation	in	photographs	seem	to	remove	any	 possibility	 of	 the	 selfie	 being	 a	 site	 for	 self-transformation,	 creation	 and	disguise.	The	pressure	to	create	the	fantasy/ideal	body	in	reality	undermines	the	idea	that	the	individual	is	only	limited	by	imagination.	When	reality	fails	to	live	up	to	body	image	ideals,	it	is	the	real	body	that	is	changed.	The	sign-values	of	the	body	are	not	expanded	in	this	process,	only	condensed	and	exaggerated	through	a	process	of	hysterical	identification.			Hysterical	Selfies	In	 the	Salpêtrière	hospital	 in	 the	nineteenth	 century,	hysterical	 gestures	and	poses	 were	 enacted	 and	 re-enacted	 for	 an	 audience.	 As	 with	 the	 responses	received	by	individuals	who	post	selfies	on	social	media	websites,	the	hysterics	of	the	Salpêtrière	were	also	able	to	gauge	their	ability	to	become	the	object	of	the	other's	desire	based	on	audience	responses.	Asti	Hustvedt	describes	how	“the	best	performers	attracted	large	audiences	and	their	shows	even	went	on	the	road,	travelling	to	other	hospitals	and	amphitheatres”	(Hustvedt,	p.	92).	The	hysteric’s	knowledge	of	this	popularity	is	described	anecdotally	in	instances	of	 primadonna	 behaviour	 amongst	 the	 patients.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 memoir	Alphonse	Daudet	describes	 a	 scenario	 in	which	Balmann,	 the	 pseudonym	he	used	for	Blanche,	“the	Queen	of	Hysterics,”	refused	to	take	to	the	“stage”	during	one	 of	 Charcot’s	 lectures	 because	 a	 less	 beautiful	 and	 less	 talented	
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hysteric	had	been	brought	out	before	her	(Hustvedt,	p.	35).	It	seems	she	and	the	other	hysterics	were	aware	of	how	desirable	 their	 symptoms	were,	which	 is	likely	 to	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 condensation	 and	 refinement	 of	 the	iconographic	poses.		 Although	Charcot	dispelled	the	myth	that	hysteria	was	a	female	malady,	the	 symptoms	 displayed	 by	 hysterical	 patients	 seemed	 to	 simultaneously	reinforce	and	confound	social	expectations	of	bourgeois	gender	roles.	At	a	time	when	the	ideal	middle	or	upper	class	woman	tended	to	stay	at	home,	without	voicing	 her	 own	 opinions,	 and	 repressed	 the	 sensations	 of	 her	 body,	 the	hysterical	symptoms	of	loss	of	voice,	paralysis	and	anaesthesia	could	be	viewed	as	concrete	enactments	of	social	restriction	upon	the	body.	As	the	students	of	the	 Salpêtrière	 were	 told,	“ one	 might	 even	 say	 that	 hysterics	 are	 more	womanly	than	other	women”(Charles	Richet	qud.	in	Kaplan,	p.	458).	Through	an	iconography	of	aberrant	gestures	the	hysterical	patient	attempted	to	be	the	object	of	 the	other’s	desire.	By	alternating	between	performances	of	sexual	provocateur	 and	 saintly	 religious	 devotee	 the	 hysterical	 women	 brought	attention	to	the	artificiality	of	these	constructions.		 This	 spectacular	 illness	 captured	 the	 public	 imagination;	representations	 of	 hysterics	 were	 not	 only	 found	 on	 the	 walls	 and	 in	 the	cabinets	of	the	Salpêtrière,	but	also	filled	the	pages	of	newspapers	and	novels,	and	 populated	 performances	 on	 stage	 and	 screen.	 Charcot’s	 lectures	were	very	popular,	 attracting	 tourists,	 journalists,	writers	and	actresses	as	well	 as	doctors	and	students.	Even	the	famous	actress,	Sarah	Bernhardt,	spent	time	in	a	cell	in	the	Salpêtrière	while	preparing	for	a	stage	performance.	The	hysterics	achieved	 circumscribed	 celebrity	 status,	 and	 their	 passionate	 hysterical	gestures	 were	 transmitted	 to	 the	 public	 through	 popular	 culture.	 Socially	acceptable	 feminine	behaviours	took	on	an	aspect	of	 the	aberrant	body.	 If	“hysteria	became	every	woman’s	expression	of	intense	passion”(Appignanesi	,	 p.	 378),	 perhaps	 society	 women	 also	 unconsciously	 protested	 against	 the	restrictions	 of	 femininity.	 If	 this	 is	 so,	 hysteria	 could	 present	 a	 model	 for	 a	positive	contagion	when	it	passes	from	pathological	illness	to	popular	culture.	
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	 Through	a	process	of	idealisation	and	identification	the	gestures	of	the	hysterics	became	standardised	and	exaggerated.	It	appears	that	the	reduction	of	poses	and	facial	expressions	to	a	legend	in	selfies	could	also	draw	attention	to	 the	 artificial	 construction	 of	 the	 body	 as	 a	 commodity-fetish.	 Perhaps	 the	selfie	can	be	read	ironically.		Dialectical	Signs	If	selfies	suggest	that	an	individual	is	presenting	her	or	his	body	in	a	hysterical	denial	of	lack,	the	structure	of	the	commodity-fetish	encourages	this	hysteria.	The	 commodity	 is	 characterised	 by	 lack;	 as	 a	 commodity-on-display,	 the	superficial	appeal	of	the	surface	conceals	a	deficit	of	quality	that	results	from	mass	production	techniques,	and	as	a	sign-value	the	object	is	a	signifier	which	points	 to,	 but	 does	 not	 actually	 possess,	 the	 quality	 that	 is	 signified.	 The	commodified	body	is	also	subjected	to	this	process;	it	loses	individuality,	and	the	 promises	 made	 in	 advertisements	 of	 health	 and	 status	 are	 not	 always	fulfilled.	The	sign-value	of	 the	commodity-body	serves	to	conceal	 lack	with	a	positive	 sign.	 In	 For	 a	 Critique	 of	 the	 Political	 Economy	 of	 the	 Sign,	 Jean	Baudrillard	suggests	that	use-,	exchange-	and	sign-value	define			a	full,	positive	world,	relentlessly	completed	by	the	plus	sign:	the	logic	of	surplus	 value	 (inseparable	 from	 value).	 It	 is	 a	 world	 in	 which	 man	 is	incapable	 of	 selling	 himself	 short… Value	 is	 totalitarian.	 It	 excludes	ambivalence,	as	well	as	any	relation	in	which	man	would	cease	to	complete	himself	in	value,	or	index	himself	according	to	the	law	of	equivalence	and	surplus	value	(Baudrillard,	p.	206).		In	 order	 to	 destabilize	 a	 sign-value	 system	 populated	 with	 positive	 signs,	ambivalence	 must	 be	 introduced	 with	 negative	 signs.	 When	 describing	 the	dialectical	 potential	 of	 Surrealism,	 Benjamin	 suggests	 that	 the	 montage’s	power	 lay	 in	 its	 un-reconciled	 and	 disharmonious	 elements,	 creating	 a	contradiction	that	enables	them	to	simultaneously	express	utopian	idealism	and	its	cynical	denial	(Benjamin	qud	in	Buck-Morrs,	p.	144).	In	order	to	disrupt	the	
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sign-value	of	the	body	and	become	truly	dialectical,	selfies	must	simultaneously	present	a	positive	and	negative	sign.		 Bodies	in	various	stages	of	undress	are	not	the	only	signs	in	selfies.	The	banality	of	the	things	that	surround	them	actually	seem	to	reveal	more	than	the	bodies	themselves.		The	objects	are	all	part	of	the	presentation;	the	hair	clips,	cosmetic	bottles	and	clothes	strewn	across	the	floor	provide	a	narrative	of	the	construction	of	the	body	as	an	image.	The	objects	are	signs	of	the	labour	that	has	taken	place;	they	reinforce	the	body	as	a	commodity-fetish.	In	Benjamin’s	terms,	 they	 produce	 the	“ profane	 glimmer	 [that]	 makes	 the	 commodity	phosphorescent”(Benjamin,	p.	131).	The	loss	of	quality	(or	individual	human	characteristics)	 that	 results	 from	mass	 production	 is	 concealed	 by	 an	 over-determination	of	the	surface.	By	presenting	the	objects	used	in	the	process	of	manufacture,	the	illusion	of	the	body	is	brought	to	the	viewer’s	attention.		 According	to	Lacan,	there	is	a	fracture	or	split	in	each	person	between	the	“being	and	its	semblance,	between	itself	and	that	paper	tiger	it	shows	to	the	other”	(Lacan,	a,	p.	107).	The	“paper	tiger”	functions	as	a	lure	or	a	form	of	intimidation	when	the	individual	is	trying	to	seduce	or	fight	another	person.	In	 these	 kinds	 of	 selfie	 the	 juxtaposition	 of	 products	 that	 assist	 in	 the	construction	of	a	“mask,	a	double	[…]	a	thrown-off	skin”		(Lacan,	a,	p.	107)		strengthens	the	notion	that	the	body	presented	in	the	photograph	is	just	that,	a	semblance	or	a	creation.	The	position	of	the	body	as	the	object	of	the	other’s	desire	is	undermined	if	the	semblance	becomes	too	apparent	before	seduction	or	domination	takes	place.				 There	is	creative	and	disruptive	potential	in	the	gap	between	being	and	semblance.	There	the	body	oscillates	between	a	docile	object	with	the	potential	to	satisfy	desire	and	a	false	image	that	will	fail	to	reciprocate	desire;	it	seduces	the	viewer	with	a	body	that	does	not	exist.			 In	Womanliness	as	Masquerade	Joan	Riviere	describes	how	a	successful	academic	woman	seemed	to	undermine	her	intellectual	abilities	when	lecturing	in	 front	 of	 her	 male	 colleagues.	 	 Instead	 of	 displaying	 her	 authority	 and	commanding	the	respect	of	her	peers	she	became	“flippant	and	joking,	so	much	so	 that	 it	 has	 caused	 comment	 and	 rebuke	 (Riviere,	 p.	 308).	 She	 wore	 her	
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femininity	as	a	disguise	that	concealed	her	intellectual	brilliance	to	reassure	the	men	in	the	audience	that	she	was	still	only	a	woman.	However,	Stephen	Heath	points	out	that	the	masquerade	of	femininity	does	not	constitute	submission	to	patriarchal	 authority.	 The	 men	 who	 witness	 her	 masquerade	 are	simultaneously	reassured	because	 she	 is	 acting	as	 they	expect	 and	disturbed	because	they	know	she	is	a	fantasy.	The	masquerading	woman	is	illusory	and	does	 not	 really	 exist	 (Heath,	 p57-8).	 In	Mad	 Men	 and	 Medusas:	 Reclaiming	
Hysteria	 Juliet	 Mitchell	 attributes	 the	 academic	 woman’s	 masquerade	 to	hysteria.	She	argues	that	because	Lacan	used	Riviere’s	theory	of	masquerade	to	theorise	all	femininity	as	masquerade	–	“La	femme	n’existe	pas…”	(Lacan,	b,	p.	68)	-	hysteria	was	subsumed	into	femininity.	All	femininity	became	hysterical	and	the	diagnosis	of	hysteria	was	banished	to	medical	history	(Mitchell,	p.	187).		 The	 objects	 that	 surround	 the	 figure	 in	 some	 selfies	 are	 the	 tools	 for	turning	the	body	 into	an	enchanting	object	and	the	means	of	exposing	 it	as	a	fraudulent	construction;	a	feitico.	The	hysterics’	excessive	“presentification
”	 also	points	 to	 the	artificiality	of	 the	performance	of	 gender	 identity.	They	provide	evidence	that	the	body	in	the	photograph	is	“a	labour	of	appearances	and	 signs ” (Baudrillard,	 p.	 91).	 Desire	 is	 provoked	 and	 potentially	extinguished;	 the	 sign-values	 communicated	 by	 these	 bodies	 could	 also	 be	introjected	or	rejected	by	the	viewer	depending	on	her	or	his	response	to	the	image.	 In	 the	 process	 of	 disavowal	 the	 negative	 signs	 are	 apprehended	 and	denied,	imposing	unconscious	acknowledgement	of	them.	This	is	the	potential	power	of	the	selfie,	a	demonstration	of	how	aberrant	signs	can	be	smuggled	into	the	system	of	sign-value	exchange	using	the	distracting,	enchanting	nature	of	the	commodity-body	fetish.			 Didi-Huberman	 says	 that	 the	 iconography	 of	 hysterical	 poses	 was	“always	 becoming	 more	 demonstrative,	 in	 high	 colours… 	 according	 to	 its	distinguished	 character	 of	 a	 pact,	 and	 of	 connivance,	 too.	 (‘ Connivance:	
connivere:	means	at	one	and	the	same	time:	I	wink,	I	blink,	I	close	my	eyes.’)”(	Didi-Huberman,	 p.	 171).	 The	wink	 suggests	a	 flirtatious	 action	designed	 to	court	the	gaze	of	the	other.	It	is	a	signal,	an	invitation	and	a	gesture	of	complicity.	It	is	also	a	sign	of	mockery	and	a	display	of	knowledge	designed	to	highlight	a	
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deficit	of	knowledge	in	someone	else.	It	is	a	gap	between	two	opposing	signs,	a	blind	spot	in	which	other	aberrant,	disruptive	gestures	could	be	inserted.		 If	selfies	are	viewed	as	an	 ironic	parody	of	 the	commodification	of	 the	body	 in	 capitalism,	 they	 could	 challenge	hegemonic	body	 ideals.	But	 irony	 is	simultaneously	 positive	 and	 negative	 toward	 its	 object.	 The	 object	 is	“both	rejected	and	introjected,	negated	and	preserved”(Schor,	p	.	97).	The	sign-value	of	the	body	as	a	commodity	fetish	continues	to	circulate.	In	The	Arcades	Project	Walter	Benjamin	suggests	that	consumers	can	appropriate	commodities	as	“wish	images”	of	a	different,	and	perhaps,	revolutionary	social	order:			For	 this	 to	 occur,	 estrangement	 of	 the	 commodity	 from	 their	 initial	meaning	 as	 use-values	 produced	 by	 human	 labour	 is	 in	 fact	 the	prerequisite,	it	is,	after	all,	the	nature	of	the	allegorical	object	that	once	the	initial	hollowing	out	of	meaning	has	occurred	and	a	new	signification	has	been	 arbitrarily	 inserted	 into	 it,	 this	 meaning	“ can	 at	 any	 time	 be	removed	in	favour	of	any	other”(Benjamin	qud.	in	Buck-Morss,	pp.	181-2)		 	 	In	order	to	be	transformed	into	a	“wish	image”	and	agent	of	change,	the	body	must	 be	 divested	 of	 the	 sign-values	 of	 capitalism	 and	 filled	with	 a	 different	significance.	If	health	is	intertwined	with	ideas	of	sexual	objectification	and	is	deemed	to	a	be	an	empowering	choice	of	the	individual,	perhaps	ill	health	offers	a	significance	that	escapes	this	sign-value	exchange.		Negative	Signs	Lack	 of	 health	 suggests	 the	 individual	 is	 unable	 to	 balance	 the	 conflicting	demands	of	production	and	consumption.	Robert	Crawford	describes:		On	 one	 hand	 we	must	 repress	 desires	 for	 immediate	 gratification	 and	cultivate	 a	 work	 ethic,	 on	 the	 other,	 as	 consumers	 we	 must	 display	 a	boundless	capacity	to	capitulate	to	desire	and	indulge	in	impulse;	we	must	hunger	for	constant	and	immediate	satisfaction.	The	regulation	of	desire	
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thus	 becomes	 an	 ongoing	 problem,	 constantly	 besieged	 by	 temptation,	while	socially	condemned	for	over	indulgence	(Crawford,	p.	199).		The	imperatives	to	over-indulge	in	celebration	and	control	the	body	against	its	appetites	 could	 be	 read	 in	 the	 extreme	 eating	 habits	 of	 addiction 1 	and	restriction.	The	requirements	of	capitalism	are	taken	to	pathological	extremes;	they	produce	bodies	that	expose	the	contradictory	messages	of	consumerism.			 The	anorexic	consumer	type	implies	a	disharmony	between	production	and	 consumption,	 in	which	 consumption	 is	 drastically	minimized	 and	 body-labour,	 such	as	exercise	and	calorie-counting,	 is	 valued	 to	an	excessive	 level.	Because	it	is	fundamentally	a	refusal	to	consume,	consumer	society	attempts	to	discipline	the	anorexic	body.	Medical	intervention	by	the	state	tries	to	transform	the	 anorexic	 body	 into	 a	 consuming	 body	 because	 significantly	 reduced	consumption	 is	 unacceptable	 in	 consumer	 society,	 and	 the	 excessive	 body-labour	 of	 the	 anorexic	 can	 be	 fatal.	 Rather	 than	 undermine	 the	 anorexic’s	body-labour	work	ethic	it	is	redirected	toward	health	and	fitness.	In	the	clinic	exercise	 is	 restricted,	 because	 eating	 disorder	 sufferers	 often	 use	 it	 to	compensate	 for	 calorie	 consumption.	 The	 patients	 must	 reach	 a	 particular	weight	(known	as	their	“exercise	weight”)	 to	be	deemed	medically	safe	 to	exercise	(Gremillion,	p.	388).	Exercise	 is	simultaneously	a	symptom	of	 illness	and	a	method	of	recovery.	By	negotiating	a	compromise	between	consumption	and	 exercise,	 the	 value	 of	 thinness	 is	maintained,	 but	 the	way	 it	 is	 achieved	becomes	productive.	Inpatient	clinics	reinforce	preoccupation	with	weight	and	calorie	counting	while	teaching	patients	how	to	manage	their	consumption	in	order	to	remain	within	the	lower	limits	of	the	socially	acceptable	body	ideal.		The	diet	industry	attempts	to	commodify	self-starvation	by	advertising	appetite	suppressants	and	metabolism	boosters	on	“thinspiration”	websites.	Thinspiration”	or	“pro-ana”	(pro-anorexia)	websites	are	blogs	created	by	individuals	with	 eating	 disorders.	 The	writers	 share	 stories	 about	 their	 own	
																																																								1 	I	 am	 using	 the	 term	 food	 addict	 rather	 than	 binge	 eater	 because	 this	 is	 the	 terminology	increasingly	 used	 in	 eating	 disorder	 research	 centers.	 Although	 it	 does	 provide	 a	 frame	 of	reference	for	a	relationship	to	food	that	is	beyond	the	control	of	the	sufferer,	it	can	appear	to	reduce	pathological	illness	to	physical	symptoms.	
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weight	 loss	 regimes,	 provide	 tips	 on	 how	 to	 lose	 weight	 and	 how	 to	 evade	detection	by	doctors,	family	members	and	friends.	They	frequently	contain	“thinspiration” 	 or	“thinspo” 	 pages	 with	 images	 of	 their	 own	 emaciated	bodies,	images	of	other	eating	disorder	sufferers	or	very	thin	celebrities.	Many	pro-eating	 disorder	websites	 suggest	 methods	 of	 distraction	 or	 rewards	 for	resisting	 food	 that	are	also	 couched	 in	 terms	of	 consumption	and	bodywork.	Visitors	 to	 one	 website	 are	 encouraged	 to	 undertake	 some	 of	 the	 following	activities	to	prevent	them	from	giving	in	to	hunger	pangs:			Exfoliate	your	entire	body,	take	a	long	hot	bath,	pluck/wax	your	eyebrows,	paint	your	finger	and	toe	nails,	use	crest	white	strips,	apply	self-tanner,	try	a	new	hairstyle,	have	your	hair	cut,	straighten	your	hair,	give	yourself	a	makeover	with	totally	different	makeup,	shave/wax	your	legs,	put	a	face	mask	on,	go	for	a	manicure	or	pedicure	(Unknown,	Pro-ana	Distractions).		The	 creator	 of	 this	 website	 also	 suggests	 visitors	 search	 online	 to	“ find	something	you	love,	and	get	it	once	you	go	x	number	of	days	without	binging.”	Another	suggests	that	the	readers	calculate	how	much	money	they	have	saved	by	not	buying	food	and	reward	themselves	with	a	shopping	trip	for	smaller	sized	clothing	(Unknown	author,	My	Diet	Distractions	and	Tips	for	Not	Eating).	These	recommendations	turn	self-starvation	into	an	activity	that	enables	consumption	of	commodities	and	produces	sign-value	for	the	body.	Capitalism	pursues	the	anorexic	through	illness	and	health.			 The	anorexic	produces	the	self	as	an	acceptable	and	unbearable	image,	fixating	 on	 a	 slender	 ideal	 but	 distorting	 the	 sign-value	 of	 the	 body	 in	 the	process.	 This	 body	 interrupts	 the	 repetitious	 order	 of	 consumerism	 and	 the	commodified	body	ideals	imposed	by	it.	It	is	handcrafted	and	demands	a	look	that	is	also	specifically	created	for	its	form;	a	generic	look	will	not	do.	As	Susie	Orbach	says:		 She	demands	to	be	related	to	originally.	Reflexive	responses	–	for	example,	flirtatious	 or	 patronizing	 ones	 from	 men,	 or	 the	“once	 over” 	 from	
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another	woman	who	needs	 to	position	herself…	 –	 are	 confounded.	She	defies	easy,	comfortable	definition…	She	is	now	looked	at,	not	as	someone	who	is	appealing,	but	as	some-body	one	cannot	take	one’s	eyes	off	[…]	A	presence	which	demands	a	response	rather	than	a	reflex	(Orbach,	b,	p.	68).		The	 anorexic	 body	 disrupts	 the	 process	 of	 projection	 and	 introjection.	Psychoanalysts	describe	anorexia	as	a	failure	of	identification,	and	an	inability	to	 introject	 images	 from	 outside.	 In	“Anorexia	 and	 Femininity” 	 Pierrette	Lavanchy	describes	the	anorexic	relation	with	the	external	world:		Anorexic	persons	profess	that	they	want	to	present	a	different	image	in	respect	 to	 the	 one	 people	want	 them	 to	 present.	 But	 as	 their	 personal	wishes	are	so	much	enmeshed	with	other	people’s	opinions,	they	cannot	find	an	angle	of	 themselves	 that	 is	not	 inhabited	by	 (and	contaminated	with)	others'	thought	of	desire.	Therefore	they	can	express	what	they	want	only	as	a	refusal	of	models	(Lavanchy,	p.	115).		 	 	This	 refusal	 of	 models	 could	 also	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 refutation	 of	 the	commodified	 sign-value	 of	 the	 body	 and	 its	 dissemination	 via	 hysterical	identification.	There	is	a	repudiation	of	the	creative	potential	of	consumerism,	in	which	the	individual	demonstrates	their	prestige	by	the	selectivity	of	their	purchases.	These	consumers	do	not	create	themselves	through	consumption.			 The	 anorexic	 body	 annihilates	 the	 sign-value	 exchange	 system	 by	reflecting	the	lack	that	is	denied	in	the	hysterical,	commodified	body.	The	sign-value	of	the	body	is	circulated	through	the	system	of	exchange.	When	I	identify	with	another	body,	I	acknowledge	equivalence	as	I	seek	out	the	differences	that	provide	my	own	body	with	differential	value.	The	anorexic	body	disrupts	 the	notion	of	similarity;	the	“like-me”	that	enables	the	designation	of	better	or	worse	is	stopped	in	its	tracks.	Its	uniqueness	functions	in	a	way	that	is	difficult	to	define;	it	seems	to	inhabit	an	entirely	different	value	system	outside	the	law	of	equivalence	and	surplus-value.	
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	 Baudrillard	argues	that	symbolic	exchange	annihilates	the	positive	value	of	consumer	society.	In	symbolic	exchange	the	objects	are	gifted	and	re-gifted	but	 never	 possessed	 or	 used.	 	 The	 value	 system	 is	 annulled	 because	 neither	party	 gains	 from	 the	 exchange.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 anorexic	 as	 an	aberrant	 consumer	 prevents	 the	 use	 of	 the	 body	 as	 a	 surface	 for	 the	communication	and	exchange	of	signs	because	it	will	not	introject	external	sign-values	 and	 prevents	 others	 from	 identifying	 with	 and	 assimilating	 what	 it	signifies.		 Perhaps	this	can	be	demonstrated	by	the	phenomenon	of	thinspiration,	the	large	volume	of	photographs	devoted	to	the	celebration	of	extreme	thinness.	Individuals	 post	 selfies	 that	 emphasise	 their	 skeletal	 forms;	 they	 are	 clearly	proud	of	the	work	ethic	implied	by	their	bodily	transformation,	but	they	do	not	construct	the	viewing	positions	created	by	other	selfies.	Despite	the	importance	of	 the	body	 in	thinspiration	 it	 is	rarely	shown	in	 its	entirety	–	 frequently	 the	body	is	depicted	without	a	head.		 This	relation	to	the	body	could	signify	a	regression	to	“the	fantasy	of	the	fragmented	body,”	a	stage	in	early	life	prior	to	the	unifying	mirror	phase.	But	visible	muscles	and	bones	create	the	impression	of	a	hard	surface	that	will	not	be	penetrated	by	others.	As	Lavanchy	states:		[anorexics]	experience	the	other’s	influence	in	their	body	as	an	invasion	or	 a	 contamination.	 The	 more	 they	 feel	 their	 mind	 soft	 and	 ready	 for	surrender,	 the	 more	 they	 want	 to	 reduce	 their	 body	 to	 hard	 bone	(Lavanchy,	p.	120).			 	 	This	does	not	seem	to	indicate	an	 inability	 to	distinguish	self	 from	other;	 the	borders	 are	 clearly	 defined	 and	 resolutely	 patrolled.	 Nor	 does	 it	 suggest	hysterical	 fragmentation	 caused	 by	 an	 unconscious	 fear	 of	 displacement.	Identification	is	denied;	the	individual	is	given	anonymity	by	their	decapitation	and	 the	 look	of	 the	viewer	 is	disarmed	because	 it	 cannot	be	 returned.	 In	 the	process	of	identification	the	viewer	tries	to	position	her	or	his	self	as	inferior	or	superior	to	the	body	in	the	image	but	is	unable	and	so	the	exchange	of	sign-value	is	denied.		
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	 A	similar	disfigurement	takes	place	in	the	photographs	of	patients	with	hysterical	anorexia	at	the	Salpêtrière	hospital	in	the	nineteenth	century.	These	photographs	 may	 have	 been	 defaced	 to	 protect	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 patient	because	of	the	nudity	of	their	bodies,	but	the	coarseness	of	their	treatment	–	at	once	 aggressive	 and	 unsuccessful	 –	 strikes	 me	 as	 defensive.	 Susie	 Orbach	describes	 the	 experience	 of	 viewing	 an	 anorexic	 body	 where	 “anguish	 and	defiance	combine	 in	the	most	curious	way	to	make	the	observer	passive	and	motionless	in	response.	There	is	a	simultaneous	desire	to	retreat	and	move	in	closer.	The	 conflict	 renders	me	 immobile”	 (Orbach,	b,	p.	79).	 I	wonder	 if	 the	doctors	 and	 photographers	 at	 the	 Salpêtrière	 also	 experienced	 passive	 and	motionless	horror	when	viewing	the	hysterical	anorexic	body.	Perhaps	this	is	why	they	chose	to	disfigure	them.			
[PLACE	ILLUSTRATION	1.1	(S)	HERE]	 	1.1	 Two	 Photographs	 of	 a	 Woman	 Suffering	 from	 Anorexia	 (1888-1918)	
Nouvelle	Iconographie	de	la	Salpetriere.	[Journal]	Wellcome	Library:	London.			 Maybe	this	is	the	dialectical	power	of	the	body,	demonstrating	where	its	spectacularisation	might	lead.	Benjamin	suggests	that	the	illusory	nature	of	the	commodity	 becomes	 apparent	 when	 it	 is	 compared	 with	 allegorical	 objects.	Because	the	objects	used	in	allegory	are	incapable	of	expressing	the	full	meaning	of	 the	 concepts	 they	 symbolise,	 such	 as	 death	 or	 the	 dangers	of	 avarice,	 the	relation	between	 the	object	 and	 its	sign-value	 is	 trivialised	and	exposed	as	a	construction	(Benjamin	qud.	in	Buck-Morss,	p.	179).	In	the	anorexic	body	the	ideal	of	the	healthy,	slender	body	is	exposed	as	a	construction	with	a	destructive	passion;	a	demonstration	of	the	logical	end	point	for	the	aestheticised	body	as	a	commodity-fetish.	It	oscillates	between	life	and	death,	an	uncanny	image.		 Ernst	Jentsch	characterised	the	uncanny	as	confusion	between	animate	and	inanimate	that	occurs	when	a	seemingly	inanimate	object	appears	to	come	to	life	or	vice	versa.	The	anorexic	body	has	the	unsettling	appearance	of	a	subject	without	subjectivity	or	the	horror	of	a	corpse	returning	to	life.	Thoughts	of	death	may	be	unavoidable	when	viewing	these	skeletal	 figures	and	so	death	 infects	life	(Kristeva,	p.	3).	
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	 Freud	 argues	 that	 the	 sensation	 of	 the	 uncanny	 in	 The	 Sandman	 is	created	by	a	fear	of	castration	that	has	been	displaced	to	the	fear	of	losing	one
’s	eyes.	He	suggests	that	Jensch	is	wrong	to	point	to	the	uncertainty	of	Olimpia
’s	life-like	appearance	as	a	cause	of	uncanniness	(Freud,	p.	138-9).	But	in	the	story	 it	 is	 the	eyes	 that	deceive.	When	Nathanael	 looks	at	Olimpia	 through	a	magnifying	 lens	he	 is	 initially	disconcerted	by	the	“singular	look	of	 fixity	and	lifelessness”	in	her	eyes.	At	first,	he	sees	her	as	an	inanimate	object	but	his	desire	animates	her	and	eventually	“he	 fancied	a	 light	 like	humid	moonbeams	came	into	them.	It	seemed	as	if	their	power	of	vision	was	now	being	enkindled;	their	glances	share	with	ever-increasing	vivacity”	(Hoffmann,	p.	203).		 The	 eyes	 are	 the	 part	 of	 her	 body	 to	 which	 Nathanael	 looks	 for	confirmation	 of	 Olimpia's	 sentience;	 they	 are	 the	 source	 of	 the	 confusion	between	object	 and	subject,	 living	and	lifeless.	 It	seems	that	objects	of	desire	and	abjection	are	only	separated	by	the	twinkle	of	an	eye.	Perhaps	that	is	why	the	photographs	from	the	Salpêtrière	were	so	violently	marked;	if	the	eyes	of	the	anorexic	body	were	allowed	to	return	the	look	they	might	be	animated	by	desire,	bringing	the	corpse	to	life.	Alternatively,	if	they	were	lifeless	and	fixed	they	would	signify	a	living	body	stripped	of	animation	and	infect	the	viewer	with	death.	By	obscuring	the	eyes	the	body	is	neither	lifeless	nor	living,	or	perhaps	it	is	simultaneously	both.	The	issue	of	animation	has	been	disavowed.		 In	 some	 cases	 The	 Iconographie	 de	 la	 Salpêtrière	 presents	 multiple	photographs	of	hysterical	anorexia	comparing	the	body	in	health	and	illness.	In	all	cases	the	eyes	are	obliterated.	Even	the	healthy	body	is	altered	in	a	way	that	makes	it	appear	more	corpse-like;	the	eyes	resemble	the	hollow	eye	sockets	of	a	skull.	It	seems	that	the	healthy	body	also	had	to	be	dehumanised	and	turned	into	an	inanimate	object	that	could	not	return	the	gaze.	Perhaps	this	made	the	disavowal	of	subjectivity	of	the	anorexic	body	more	stable	and	complete.			
[PLACE	ILLUSTRATION	1.2	(S)	HERE]	1.2	Four	Photographs	of	a	Woman	showing	anorexia	nervosa	(1892)	Nouvelle	
Iconographie	de	la	Salpetriere.	[Journal]	Wellcome	Library:	London.		Recuperated	Signs	
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Ironic	selfies	express	a	wide	range	of	messages	within	a	single	scene.	Frequently	the	body	reinforces	social	ideals	but	the	objects	surrounding	the	body	bring	the	viewer’s	 attention	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 body	 as	 a	 commodity	 fetish.	Although	this	theory	of	the	selfie	offers	the	potential	to	smuggle	new	signs	into	popular	 culture,	 expanding	 the	 gestures	 and	 styles	 permitted	 to	 the	 body	 in	consumer	 society,	 it	 also	 enables	 negative	 signs	 to	 be	 appropriated	 in	 the	system	 of	 sign-value	 exchange.	 This	 multiplicity	 of	 connotations	 can	 have	 a	normalizing	effect	on	the	negative	signs	suggested	by	aberrant	bodies.			 Although,	 at	 its	 most	 extreme,	 the	 anorexic	 body	 of	 thinspiration	 is	viewed	with	uncanny	horror,	there	is	evidence	that	selfies	and	thinspiration	are	beginning	 to	 share	visual	 characteristics.	 In	 some	selfies	 the	bodies	are	very	slender	 with	 visible	 hipbones	 and	 ribcages,	 bodily	 characteristics	 that	 are	usually	 associated	 with	 thinspiration.	 But	 the	 detritus	 of	 ordinary	 selfies	surrounds	 the	 individuals.	 The	 bodies	 do	 not	 function	 as	 negative	 signs	 that	cannot	 be	 introjected;	 the	 commodities	 that	 surround	 them	 place	 the	 body	within	 a	 system	of	 sign-value	 exchange	 that	 a	 viewer	 can	 identify	with.	 The	commodities	are	associated	with	the	construction	of	an	ideal	body,	inferring	the	visual	 cues	 of	 emaciation	 also	 signify	 idealization	 and	 desirability.	 Skeletal	thinness	appears	as	a	style	that	can	be	identified	with	and	appropriated	when	it	is	fashionable	to	do	so.		 Other	 images	 I	have	 found	also	bear	visual	similarity	 to	 the	emaciated	selfies	found	on	Tumblr	and	other	mainstream	image	sharing	websites,	but	they	were	viewed	on	a	pro-anorexia	website.	The	body	 in	the	photograph	follows	predominant	 thinspiration	 codes	 because	 it	 is	 fragmented,	 decapitated	 and	posed	to	emphasise	bones.	But	the	untidy	room	behind	the	figure	has	more	in	common	with	a	selfie	than	a	thinspiration	photograph.	I	find	this	noteworthy	because	 it	 seems	 to	 contradict	 the	 descriptions	 of	 anorexic	 character	 traits	found	 in	 psychiatry	 and	 psychoanalysis.	 The	 typical	 anorexic	 personality	 is	characterized	by	perfectionism	and	rigidity.	The	anorexia	sufferer	fears	making	mistakes	and	may	display	obsessive-compulsive	tendencies.	The	need	to	control	food	intake	coincides	with	a	need	to	regulate	all	aspects	of	life;	everything	has	to	 be	 neatly	 organised	 and	 under	 strict	 control	 (Naser	 et	 al.,	 p.	 61).	Disorganisation	and	clutter	would	cause	anxiety	for	the	anorexic.	The	bedrooms	
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behind	the	emaciated	figure	in	the	thinspiration	photographs	do	not	connote	a	pathological	demand	for	control.	Rather	it	suggests	the	codes	of	the	emaciated	body	 celebrated	 in	 thinspiration	 have	 been	 absorbed	 into	 popular	 culture,	normalized	and	then	disseminated	as	an	ideal	body.	It	seems	that	all	signs	can	be	recuperated	within	the	system	of	sign	value	exchange	even	if	they	appear	to	be	signifiers	of	ill	heath,	death	and	a	refusal	to	consume.		Beyond	Sign-Value	Exchange	Michel	de	Certeau	says	the	skin	becomes	a	parchment	written	with	rules	and	regulations	 when	 it	 is	 shaped	 by	 cultural	 norms.	 Until	 this	 process	 of	intextuation	begins,	the	body	is	not	authorized	or	recognized	by	society.	As	de	Certeau	says	the	body	is	‘essentially	a	flesh,	which	writing	changes	into	a	body
’(de	Certeau,	p	.	145),	turning	it	into	an	identity	that	‘can	be	read	and	quoted	by	others’(de	Certeau,	p	.	149).	The	individual	must	standardise	the	body	in	return	for	social	meaning.	This	offers	a	way	of	interpreting	the	appeal	of	selfies	and	 other	 forms	 of	 online	 self-presentation;	 although	 the	 individuals	 follow	strict	aesthetic	rules	for	the	body,	they	are	validated	by	the	online	community	and	given	acceptance.	Selfie	producers	turn	their	bodies	into	signifiers	of	rules	while	giving	 the	abstract	rules	material	 form,	making	 it	‘real’.	De	Certeau	suggests	that	the	body	might	break	free	from	social	control	during	moments	of	intense	pleasure	or	pain.	He	says,	 			 the	only	force	opposing	this	passion	to	be	a	sign	is	the	cry,	a	deviation	or	an	ecstasy,	a	revolt	or	flight	of	that	which,	within	the	body,	escapes	the	law	of	the	named.	Perhaps	all	experience	that	is	not	a	cry	of	pleasure	or	pain	is	recuperated	 by	 the	 institution.	 All	 experience	 that	 is	 not	 displaced	 or	undone	by	this	ecstasy	is	captured	by	“the	love	of	the	censor,”	collected	and	utilized	by	the	discourse	of	the	law.	It	is	channelled	and	instrumented	(de	Certeau,	p	.	149).		It	seems	the	anorexic	body	is	recuperated	by	the	system	of	sign	value	exchange	because	it	embodies	a	rational,	puritan	work	ethic	that	can	be	“channelled	and	
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instrumented”	by	social	regulation.	For	‘flesh’	to	be	out	of	control	it	cannot	be	 turned	 into	 a	 body	 by	 the	 system.	 If	 the	 pain	 of	 self-starvation	 can	 be	appropriated	in	commodity	culture	perhaps	the	pleasure	of	eating,	when	it	is	not	bound	by	social	propriety	and	disapproval	of	 the	overweight	body,	could	remove	the	eater	from	the	demands	of	culturally	coded	sign	values.				 The	 disruptive	 potential	 of	 the	 over-eater	 can	 be	 discerned	 in	 the	attempts	to	transform	her/him	into	a	productive	consumer.	Sexual,	medical	and	commercial	gazes	try	to	create	both	a	feeling	of	shame	and	a	desire	for	health	in	the	subject,	while	a	plethora	of	products	and	services	are	offered	to	achieve	this	aim.	For	example,	the	diet	industry	promotes	products	that	seem	to	permit	both	imperatives	to	delay	gratification	and	seek	reward.	Diet	food,	characterised	by	chocolate,	 crisps	 and	 milk	 shakes,	 are	 the	 temptation	 and	 the	 solution	 for	temptation.	These	products	keep	the	craving	to	consume	alive	while	enabling	the	 consumer	 to	 demonstrate	 an	 acceptable	 work	 ethic	 and	 the	 desire	 to	acquiesce	 to	 social	 norms.	 Consumers	 are	 transformed	 from	 shamed	 docile	bodies	 into	 active	 confessional	 ones	 by	 turning	 their	 aberrant	 consumer	behaviour	 into	a	 form	of	consumption	that	produces	sign-value	 for	 the	body.	There	 is	 an	 in-built	 obsolescence	 to	 this	 system	because	 calorie	 control	 and	restriction	of	food	can	cause	the	metabolism	to	slow	down,	resulting	in	greater	weight	gain.	Change	takes	place	in	the	relationship	between	the	consumer	and	society,	and	not	in	the	physical	characteristics	of	the	consumers’	bodies.	They	yield	to	social	regulation	and	the	system	of	sign-value;	 the	pleasure	of	eating	chocolate	and	crisps	is	transformed	into	a	culturally	regulated	activity.	 		 The	 food	 addict	 turns	 these	 social	 regulations	 on	 their	 head,	“transforming	 freedom	 into	 determinism	 and	 desire	 into	 need.	 Rather	 than	consuming	 to	 realise	 the	 self,	 in	 the	 state	 of	 addiction,	 the	 individual	 is	consumed	by	 consumption”	(Reith,	p.	286).	This	 form	of	 food	consumption	is	not	productive;	it	does	not	create	energy	that	will	be	transformed	into	labour-value	 or	 to	 signify	 health	 that	 infers	 social	 status.	 It	 fails	 to	 conform	 to	 the	protestant	work	ethic	required	by	capitalism.	Gerda	Reith	suggests	that	addicts	appeared	in	great	numbers	when	the	demand	to	choose	from	an	endless	variety	of	 commodities	 became	most	 insistent.	 The	 occurrence	 of	 a	 large	 variety	 of	
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types	of	addiction	signifies	“a	refusal	of	choice	that	has	become	overwhelming;	a	denial	of	freedom	that	is	illusory”	(Reith,	p.	296).		 The	 food	 addict’s	 binge	 is	 said	 to	 be	 a	 capitulation	 to	 the	world	 of	commodity	 consumption.	 It	 is	 described	 as	 “…the	 relief,	 the	 letting	 go,	 the	taking	in,	the	attempted	meeting	of	desire…Her	wanting	and	wanton	part	is	in	ascendancy…She	goes	 from	 food	 to	 food	 looking	 for	 the	one	 that	will	 satisfy	her...	”	(Orbach,	a,	p.	123).	The	lure	of	novelty	and	the	“hell	of	the	new	as	the	always-the-same”	(Benjamin	qud.	in	Buck-Morss,	p.	211)	could	be	discerned	in	this	 mechanical,	 joyless	 mode	 of	 eating.	 The	 commodities	 are	 stripped	 of	content;	 they	 lose	 their	 taste,	 texture	 and	 aroma.	 Things	 that	 appear	 to	 be	objects	 of	 satisfaction	 are	 quickly	 revealed	 to	 be	 dissatisfaction	 in	 disguise.	These	analyses	of	binge	eating	and	food	addiction	assume	that	all	experiences	of	 uncontrolled	 eating	 are	 devoid	 of	 pleasure	and	wilful	 choice.	 But	 it	 is	my	hypothesis	that	it	is	precisely	pleasure	that	is	under	attack	in	the	disparagement	of	body	fat	and	over-eating.			 There	is	a	historical	precedent	for	the	vilification	of	fat	based	on	a	long-standing	link	between	sexual	appetite	and	appetite	for	food.	The	slender	body	has	 long	 been	 coded	 as	 restrained	 and	 self-denying	 in	 both	 forms	 of	 carnal	desire.	In	the	Victorian	era	the	thin	body	came	to	signify	an	ideal	passivity	and	lack	of	desire.	The	slender	body	also	signified	the	weakness	and	fragility	of	an	upper	or	middle	class	person	who	did	not	have	to	work	for	a	living.	In	opposition	to	the	association	between	thinness	and	desirable	virtuosity,	the	plump	body	was	 associated	 with	 uncontrolled	 impulses	 and	 working	 class	 coarseness	(Krugovo	Silver,	p.	11-2).			 In	1895	Caesar	Lombroso	and	Guglilmo	Ferrer	co-authored	The	Female	
Offender,	a	study	that	analysed	the	body	types	of	female	criminals	in	order	to	identify	degenerate	characteristics.	Lombroso	cites	data	published	by	Fornasari	in	Sulla	Statura	degli	Italiani,	(Milan,	1873)	which	compares	the	age,	height	and	weight	of	prostitutes	with	those	of	‘moral	women’	and	finds	that	‘height	and	age	being	equal,	the	weight	is	greatest	among	prostitutes’	(Lombroso	and	Ferrero,	p.	50).	The	differentials	in	this	experiment	are	illicit	sexual	activity	and	greater	 than	 normal	weight,	 therefore	 the	 relation	 between	 them	 is	 proven.	
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Sexual	wantonness	and	over-consumption	are	neatly	tied	together	in	another	symbol	of	degenerate	consumption,	the	prostitute.		 To	a	Victorian,	being	overweight	demonstrated	that	an	 individual	was	unable	to	eat	with	appropriate	restraint	and	decorum;	it	suggested	that	she/he	was	sexually	voracious,	possibly	to	a	criminal	degree.	Multiple	strands	of	moral,	medical	and	 judicial	control	were	used	to	repress	 fat	bodies.	The	variety	and	multitude	 of	discursive	 practices	 used	 to	 vilify	 fat	 bodies	 could	 suggest	 they	pose	a	threat	to	capitalist	order.			 In	contemporary	consumer	society,	fat	is	still	controlled	by	a	wide	range	of	 discursive	 practices.	 In	 popular	 culture,	 a	 television	 programme	 called	
Supersize	 vs	 Superskinny	 thinly	 veils	 the	 intextuation	 of	 an	 ideal	 body	 type	beneath	 the	pursuit	of	health.	 In	each	episode	of	Supersize	 vs	 Superskinny	an	overweight	 participant	 is	 paired	 with	 an	 underweight	 participant	 and	 they	swap	diets.	The	pairing	of	a	tiny	body	with	a	cornucopia	of	food,	and	a	large	body	with	 a	 meagre	 portion	 creates	 a	 grotesque	 scene.	 Indeed,	 the	 explanatory	voiceover	in	the	first	episode	of	series	one	informs	the	viewer	that	“Dr	Christian	Jessen	will	be	stuffing	the	superskinny…and	starving	the	supersized”	(Channel4	Production,	 Jenette	and	Rosemarie).	The	 language	 is	coarse	and	purposefully	emphasises	 the	 two	 bodies	 as	 “uncivilised.”	Neither	 participant	 adheres	 to	 a	socially	acceptable	manner	of	eating,	so	Dr	Jessen	employs	medically	dubious	methods	to	 intextuate	their	‘starving’	or	‘stuffed’	 flesh	 into	consuming	bodies.		 The	disjuncture	between	culture	and	flesh	 is	signified	by	the	choice	of	the	term	‘feeding	clinic’	for	the	setting	of	Supersize	vs	Superskinny.	In	episode	eleven	of	season	five	the	voiceover	announces	“It’s	dinner	time	in	the	feeding	clinic,”	which	immediately	brings	to	mind	an	impression	of	a	person	throwing	food	to	animals,	perhaps	on	a	farm	or	in	a	zoo	(Channel4	Production,	Anorexia).	To	use	the	word	feeding	rather	than	eating	or	dining	is	incredibly	dehumanising.	As	Niall	Richardson	says:			Like	 all	mammals,	 humans	 need	 to	 eat	 and,	 in	 order	 for	 the	 species	 to	continue,	need	to	have	reproductive	sex.	However,	it	is	the	way	we	have	
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disciplined	or	regimented	these	activities	which	distinguishes	us	from	our	household	pets…In	short,	for	humans	the	sexual	is	cultural.	The	same	can	be	said	for	food	(Richardson,	p.	103).		 	 	The	way	we	eat	is	not	simply	fulfilling	a	basic	need;	it	is	shaped	by	cultural	rules	and	regulations.	Richardson	says	a	person	eating	excessively,	at	the	wrong	time	or	in	an	improper	manner	appears	to	have	“ignored	the	dictates	of	culture	and	has	yielded	to	base,	animal	urges”	(Richardson,	p.	104).	Although	the	‘feeding	clinic’ 	 becomes	 the	 temporary	 home	 for	 both	 participants,	 the	 name	dehumanises	the	supersize	individual	to	a	greater	extent	because	she/he	is	the	one	that	‘feeds’.	The	thin	body	consumes	reluctantly,	nibbling	rather	than	gorging.	 She/he	 remains	within	 culturally	 coded	dining,	 eating	at	 the	 correct	times,	without	indication	of	voracious	appetite	and	animalistic	urges.			 Dr	 Jessen	 visually	 demonstrates	 the	 differences	 in	 supersize	 and	superskinny	diets	by	placing	each	participant’s	typical	weekly	food	intake	into	a	transparent	tube.	When	mixed	together	and	viewed	in	this	unusual	way,	the	contents	become	unrecognizable	as	food.	It	appears	to	have	been	abjected	from	the	body	as	vomit,	or	perhaps	the	feeding	tube	symbolizes	a	transparent	body	with	stomach	contents	swimming	in	bile.	The	food	is	presented	in	a	manner	that	seems	to	hover	between	scientific	experiment	and	bodily	process.			 The	 intention	 of	 the	 television	 programme	 is	 to	 vilify	 rather	 than	celebrate	over-eating	so	the	food	must	be	transformed	from	desirable	to	abject	material.	Both	participants	are	encouraged	to	treat	the	content	of	the	tubes	with	disgust.	For	the	superskinny	person	who	already	demonstrates	an	aversion	to	food	this	probably	does	not	come	as	much	of	a	shock.	But	for	the	supersizer	who	takes	pleasure	in	eating,	this	must	be	an	uncomfortable	experience	of	aversion	therapy.	 This	 individual	 is	 being	 trained	 to	 treat	 a	 source	 of	 pleasure	 with	disgust.	The	tubes	symbolize	the	intextuation	of	eating;	the	participant	must	eat	with	scientific	precision,	weighing	ingredients	and	balancing	calorie	intake	with	energy	expenditure.	It	symbolizes	the	flesh	being	inscribed	as	a	body.		 Throughout	 their	 participation	 on	 Supersize	 vs	 Superskinny	 the	underweight	 person	 is	 presented	 with	 a	 seemingly	 endless	 succession	 of	
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gargantuan	unhealthy	meals	while	the	overeater	is	subjected	to	small	quantities	of	bland	food.	It	is	the	bland	and	repetitive	diet	of	the	superskinny	participant	that	seems	to	demonstrate	mechanical,	joyless	eating	common	in	descriptions	of	binge	eating	and	addiction.	The	supersize	participant	watches	with	pleasure	as	 the	 superskinny	 tucks	 in	 to	 her	 or	 his	 favourite	 food.	 The	 supersize	participant’s	excitement	is	palpable,	as	they	smell	the	aroma	of	the	food	and	probably	imagine	the	taste	and	texture	that	accompanies	it.	This	indicates	to	me	the	pleasures	of	the	flesh	practiced	outside	the	bounds	of	cultural	control.			Hysterical	Identification	and	Anti-Pleasure	At	the	beginning	of	each	episode	of	Supersize	vs	Superskinny	all	the	participants	in	 the	series	line	up	 in	their	underwear	–	 the	supersized	on	one	side	and	the	superskinny	 on	 the	 other.	 Dr	 Christian	 Jessen	 is	 situated	 between	 the	 two	groups	of	people,	and	so	is	an	old	fashioned	weighing	scale.	The	weighing	scale	is	 the	 means	 of	 judgment	 for	 these	 bodies;	 it	 will	 chart	 the	 participant’s	journey	 toward	 social	 acceptance.	 When	 I	 watch	 Supersize	 vs	 Superskinny	 I	identify	 with	 the	 doctor	 and	 the	 weighing	 machine,	 putting	 myself	 in	 the	privileged	position	of	socially	acceptable	body	type.	In	my	mind,	the	excesses	of	indulgence	 and	 self-denial	 fan	 out	 to	 either	 side	 of	me.	 This	 visual	message	clearly	demonstrates	the	parameters	of	the	acceptable	body.			 The	 bodies	 awaiting	 judgment	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 each	 episode	 are	wearing	‘standard-issue’	underwear;	 the	garments	are	neither	ornate	nor	individualistic,	they	do	not	represent	the	wearer’s	personal	tastes	or	attempt	to	conceal	the	body	in	a	way	that	is	flattering	or	incites	the	sexual	curiosity	of	the	viewer.	The	garments	are	de-eroticising	and	standardizing.	The	bodies	are	reduced	to	objects	of	inspection	for	the	medical	scrutiny	of	the	doctor	and	his	measuring	devices.			 Beneath	this	objective	looking	I	catch	a	glimpse	of	a	warning,	the	veiled	threat	of	punishment	for	non-conformity.	The	medical	objectification	of	these	bodies	 suggests	 a	 loss	 of	 subjectivity;	 the	 reduction	 of	 self	 into	 an	 object	understood	through	measurements	and	records,	accumulations	of	information.		
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Moreover,	their	de-sexualisation	implies	the	loss	of	the	right	to	be	the	object	of	desire	for	the	other.	For	a	subject	assumed	to	be	hysterical,	this	is	a	dire	threat	of	non-existence,	total	eradication	of	self.		 At	the	end	of	each	programme	the	two	participants	are	reunited	after	a	number	of	months	dieting	at	home.	As	a	reward	for	disciplining	the	body	each	participant	 is	 allowed	 to	 choose	 their	own	underwear,	 often	 selecting	 bright	colours	and	lace.	The	voiceover	describing	a	superskinny	participant	says	“…she’s	even	got	a	cleavage	for	the	first	time	in	her	life”	(Channel4	Production,	Jenette	 and	Rosemarie).	 The	 superskinny	 body	 has	 confessed	 to	 a	 television	audience	and	submitted	to	discipline;	its	reward	is	to	be	acknowledged	as	an	object	of	desire	for	the	other.	The	hysterical	demand	“is	this	what	you	want	me	to	 be?”	 receives	 an	 affirmative	 response.	 The	praise	 offered	 to	 the	 supersize	body	is	couched	in	terms	of	health,	rather	than	desirableness.	It	continues	to	be	de-sexualised	 because	 it	 already	 signifies	 a	 carnal	 pleasure:	 	 the	 forbidden	pleasure	of	eating	that	could	destabilize	cultural	control.			 The	 fat	 body	 exists	 outside	 of	 the	 system	 of	 sign-value	 exchange;	 it	signifies	dehumanising	 loss	of	 subjectivity	and	animal	urges,	but	 in	 capitalist	communities	the	identity	that	is	lost	is	hysterical.	The	overeater	escapes	endless	hysterical	 identifications	 and	 joyless,	 compulsive	 consumption.	 The	dehumanising	 loss	 of	 subjectivity	 of	 the	 fat	 body	 does	 not	 connote	 the	eradication	of	pleasure	and	destruction	of	the	body	as	in	the	case	of	the	anorexic.			Nor	does	it	resemble	the	hysterical	pleasure	of	presentation	that	only	resides	on	 the	 surface	 as	 an	 image	 of	 pleasure.	 The	 overeater	 experiences	 pleasure	outside	the	reach	of	capitalist	signification;	she/he	has	the	cake	and	is	allowed	to	eat	it	too.			
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